In two experiments (N ϭ 64), we told 6-to 7-year-olds about improbable or impossible outcomes (Experiment 1) and about impossible outcomes concerning ordinary or magical agents (Experiment 2). In both experiments, children claimed that the outcomes were impossible and could not happen, but nonetheless generated realistic and natural explanations for the outcomes. These findings show that 6-to 7-year-olds are strongly inclined to provide natural explanations. The findings are also informative about children's judgments about whether outcomes are possible, and further suggest that asymmetries between children's predictions and explanations may stem from differences in how these 2 forms of reasoning are constrained by possibility.
The same event can often be explained by both supernatural and natural explanations. For example, the creation of the stars could be explained by a supernatural cause like divine intervention, or a natural cause like the movement of gases. During early and middle childhood, children generate both kinds of explanations. They produce a wide variety of natural explanations by drawing on their understanding of physical, biological, psychological, and social causation (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001) . They use physical forces and mechanisms (e.g., gravity, gears) to explain why people cannot fly and how toys move (Gelman & Gottfried, 1996; Sobel, 2004) . They use biological entities (e.g., germs, organ function) to explain why people get sick and how our blood moves (Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Miller & Bartsch, 1997) . They use psychological states and processes (e.g., beliefs, desires, memories) to explain why someone looked in the wrong place for a toy or why an otherwise innocuous experience might make someone sad (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004) . Finally, they use knowledge of the social world (e.g., norms, group membership) to answer questions such as why someone should not be excluded from a group or why someone acted harmfully (Nucci & Weber, 1995; Rhodes, 2014) .
Likewise, children produce supernatural explanations. They use magical forces to explain the sudden appearance or disappearance of objects (Olson, Demacheva, & Raz, 2015; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Subbotsky, 2004) , and changes in objects' size, color, and quality (Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2001 Subbotsky, , 2004 . They also use such forces to explain events that violate their expectations of displacement and gravity (Berzonsky, 1971; Phelps & Woolley, 1994) . At this age, children also reference culturally specific religious beings and forces in their supernatural explanations (Evans, 2001; Gelman & Kremer, 1991; Legare & Gelman, 2008; Nguyen & Rosengren, 2004; Woolley, Cornelius, & Lacy, 2011 ; for a review see Legare, Evans, Rosengren, & Harris, 2012) . Sesotho-speaking South African children sometimes use bewitchment to explain the spread of AIDS (Legare & Gelman, 2008) . American children sometimes use divine intervention to explain positive chance events (Woolley et al., 2011) . Vietnamese American children are slightly more likely to reference magic in their explanations of illness than European American children (Nguyen & Rosengren, 2004 ). Children's use of these explanations increases with religiosity and age, and peaks in adulthood (Woolley et al., 2011 ; also see Astuti & Harris, 2008) .
A Childhood Inclination to Produce Natural Explanations
Given that children can produce both natural and supernatural explanations, how do they determine which to produce? Here, we investigate the possibility that children are strongly inclined to produce natural explanations (also see Browne & Woolley, 2004; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & French, 2013; Rosengren & Hickling, 2000) . This inclination might lead children to explain outcomes and events by referring to natural causes, instead of supernatural ones, even if the outcomes are remarkable or even impossible. It is worth clarifying, though, that this inclination could be overridden by other factors in some cases-for instance, children might resort to supernatural explanations if they are culturally sanctioned (e.g., Legare et al., 2012) .
An inclination to provide natural explanations (rather than supernatural ones) could result if children typically reason according to their real-world knowledge, and do so even when thinking about novel and unfamiliar outcomes, events, and entities (Cook & Sobel, 2011; Lane, Ronfard, Francioli, & Harris, 2016) . Consistent with this, children draw on their real-world knowledge when judging whether various entities are real or have various properties (e.g., Cook & Sobel, 2011; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Van Reet, Pinkham, & Lillard, 2015) . Real-world knowledge also constrains young children's pretense and generation of fiction (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Sobel & Weisberg, 2014; Weisberg & Sobel, 2012; Weisberg, Sobel, Goodstein, & Bloom, 2013) , and even constrains what they can visually imagine (Lane et al., 2016) .
However, young children are not limited to using real-world knowledge, as even preschoolers can reason according to counterfactual or fantastic premises in some contexts (e.g., Dias & Harris, 1988; Richards & Sanderson, 1999; Van de Vondervoort & Friedman, 2014) . So it is possible that children provide supernatural explanations for some phenomena. This might become especially likely if children are asked about impossible or magical outcomes. Also, children sometimes expect that causes should resemble outcomes (Shultz & Ravinsky, 1977) , and so they could assume that magical outcomes should have magical causes. Studies showing that children's causal knowledge constrains their generation of fiction and their visual imagination (e.g., Lane et al., 2016; Sobel & Weisberg, 2014) do not speak to this possibility as these studies did not specifically ask children to engage in causal reasoning.
As such, investigating whether children are strongly inclined to generate natural explanations could contribute to our understanding of factors that shape children's explanations (also see Lombrozo, 2012 and Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) and to our understanding of the extent to which their reasoning is shaped by their real-world causal knowledge (or whether young children have a fantasy orientation; for reviews see Legare et al., 2012 and Woolley, 1997) . As we explain in the General Discussion, this investigation also contributes to our understanding of why explaining an outcome is sometimes easier than predicting it (i.e., prediction/explanation asymmetry; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Legare et al., 2009 ).
Findings From Previous Studies on Children's Explanations
Compelling evidence that children are inclined to produce natural explanations could be provided if children produced such explanations for remarkable or impossible outcomes, which could warrant supernatural explanations. Some studies suggest that children do this. In these studies, participants were asked to explain unusual or unexpected events, like becoming ill or winning the lottery (Nguyen & Rosengren, 2004; Woolley et al., 2011 ; also see Raman & Gelman, 2004 and Shtulman & Yoo, 2015) . Children gave natural explanations more often than supernatural explanations, and typically provided supernatural explanations less than adults. For instance, in one experiment children mostly mentioned natural causes when explaining unusual events that are difficult to explain (e.g., a man winning a million dollars in a contest he did not remember entering), and they referenced supernatural causal forces (e.g., "God did it") less than adults (Woolley et al., 2011) . Although these findings might suggest that children are strongly inclined to produce natural explanations, the findings are inconclusive. Children may have believed that the events were both possible and plausible, and thus may not have thought to provide supernatural explanations.
In other studies, children were asked to explain outcomes which they felt were remarkable. Children saw events that appeared to defy normal physical constraints, and were then asked to explain the events (Berzonsky, 1971; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2001 Subbotsky, , 2004 . In general, younger children, who were not familiar with the mechanisms responsible for the events, gave supernatural explanations. For example, in one study, children were shown that a piece of black foam changed colors when put into a person's hand (Phelps & Woolley, 1994) . Younger children were unfamiliar with heat sensitivity, and often gave supernatural explanations for this event. Such findings appear to suggest that children are not strongly inclined to produce natural explanations (i.e., because they offered supernatural explanations). However, these studies are also inconclusive as children may not have been able to think of any other way to explain the events: perhaps children would have provided natural explanations if they had occurred to them.
The Present Study
We examine whether children are strongly inclined to produce natural explanations by asking them about outcomes or events they deem remarkable (and which might therefore warrant supernatural explanations), but for which they have enough causal knowledge to generate natural explanations. Our approach capitalizes on recent findings showing that children aged 4 to 7 often view events that are improbable, but nonetheless possible, to be impossible (Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007 ; also see Lane et al., 2016; Nolan-Reyes, Callanan, & Haigh, 2016; and Weisberg & Sobel, 2012) . For instance, they assert that it would be impossible for a man to have a beard down to his toes, or for a girl to have an alligator under her bed. Because children can be expected to view these improbable events to be impossible, they might refer to supernatural causes when explaining them. However, because the events are actually possible, children might have the causal knowledge required to provide natural explanations for them. If children provide such explanations, it will suggest that they are strongly inclined to produce natural explanations.
We also asked children to explain variants of these outcomes that were impossible-for example, we asked about a man with a beard the length of a tall tower, and about a girl with a unicorn in her bedroom. If children are strongly inclined to produce natural explanations, they might further provide natural explanations when explaining such impossible events, even though such events defy their causal expectations and beliefs about what is possible (e.g., Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007) , and natural explanations do not adequately explain the events.
In our experiments, we focused on children aged six and seven years. We tested children in this age range for two reasons. First, it falls within the range of ages at which children view improbable events to be impossible (e.g., Lane et al., 2016; Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007) . Second, testing at these ages ensured that children would have the linguistic capacities and causal knowledge to provide easily interpretable responses to our openended questions. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Experiment 1 Participants
Thirty-two 6-and 7-year-olds (M ϭ 6;8, range ϭ 6;0 -7;4, 16 girls) were tested. In both experiments, children were tested at their elementary schools. Although demographics were not formally collected, most children in both experiments were from middle class families in the Region of of Waterloo, Canada. In this region, 79% of residents are Caucasian, and the predominant visible minority groups are South Asian and Chinese residents. Approximately 68% of residents identify their religious affiliation as Christian; the next largest religious affiliation is "No religious affiliation," as identified by 25% of residents in the area. Children in both experiments came from a variety of different schools. Different children (from different schools) were tested in each experiment.
Materials and Procedure
All children were told about three outcomes: a man with a beard, a woman with a pet, and a man with a house. Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, which only varied in whether the outcomes were improbable or impossible, as follows: the man's beard either went to his toes or all the way to the bottom of a tall tower he was standing in; the women's pet was either a peacock or a unicorn; and the man's house was either made of toothpicks or made of clouds. These outcomes were presented in either two orders (order 1: beard, pet, house, and order 2: house, beard, pet), with the experimenter describing the outcome (e.g., "Here is a woman and her bedroom. Look! She has a pet peacock.") while a picture depicting it was displayed on a laptop computer. Following the description, children were asked to explain the outcome-they were asked how the character acquired the item (e.g., "How did she get it?"). After every explanation, children were congratulated for their good idea regardless of its quality. If children did not answer or responded "I don't know," they were only prompted once, with the following prompt: "What do you think? You can say whatever you want." Then children were asked if the outcome could happen in real life (e.g., "Could a person have a pet peacock in real life?"). Answers to this question were noted during testing.
Notably, providing natural explanations for these outcomes would likely require children to draw on different types of causal knowledge. Natural explanations for the length of a beard might require biological knowledge, explanations about the existence of a house might require knowledge of artifacts and how they are created, and explanations about possession of a pet might require an understanding of commerce and domestication. Thus, if children do produce natural explanations, we will know that their inclination to produce such explanations is not limited to one domain of understanding. Previous research confirms that children are able to tailor their explanations to the type of outcome they are explaining in this way (Nancekivell, & Friedman, 2014) .
Transcription, Coding, and Scoring
All testing sessions were audio recorded onto a laptop and then transcribed by a research assistant. The first author then prepared the transcripts for coding in two steps. First, she removed all condition-related terms, and replaced each with a generic term in square brackets. For example, sentences like "She bought the unicorn" and "she bought the peacock" would be changed to read "She bought the [animal] ." Second, she removed "I don't know" responses, and responses that were incoherent, silent, or nonexplanations (e.g., "It's a trick"; 10 responses out of 96). By removing this information, she ensured that the transcripts could be blindly coded (i.e., the coders would not know which condition each explanation came from).
Three research assistants independently coded children's explanations. First coders rated how likely the events in the explanation were, using a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (completely impossible) to 5 (completely possible). The intercoder reliability for these scores was high, Cronbach's alpha ϭ .85. For each item (beard, pet, house), coders' scores were averaged to yield one score. See Table 1 for some sample explanations that received differing scores on the 0 -5 scale.
The coders also judged whether each explanation included magical or impossible events ("yes or no"). The inter-coder reliability for this category was substantial, Fleiss Kappa ϭ .73. Each response was scored 1 when coders judged it included magical impossible events, and scored 0 when they judged it did not include such events, with children assigned separate scores for each outcome; when coders disagreed, the majority judgment was used. Coders also answered two other "yes/no" questions: whether the explanations included possible events, and whether they thought the children were explaining events which could really happen. These categories showed similar patterns of results as the magic question but had lower interrater reliability, so they were not included in our analyses.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses revealed that responses varied across the Beard, Pet, and House outcomes, so we conducted separate analyses on each outcome. We first examined children's judgments of whether the outcomes were remarkable and impossible; see Table 2 for the percentage of children saying that each outcome He went up to the sky and got a [material] and built a house. She climbed a really high tower, and she got it and then she added a door and a window and a roof. Higher scores (4) (5) Well well probably from the pet store. Mmm, he probably growed it. Uh maybe she won at the farm in like a different country. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
was impossible. Most children judged that outcomes in both conditions were impossible, Binomial tests, p values Յ .037; the only exception was the improbable version of Pet, where children were no more likely than chance to say that the outcome was impossible, p ϭ .804. Hence, children generally viewed the outcomes as remarkable and impossible. We next examined ratings of children's explanations on the scale ranging from 0 completely impossible to 5 completely possible; see Table 3 for means ratings and standard deviations for each outcome. Ratings did not differ by condition for Beard, Mann-Whitney U ϭ 101.50, z ϭ 0.95, p ϭ .470, or Pet, U ϭ 96.00, z ϭ 1.27, p ϭ .239, but did differ for House, with higher ratings assigned in the improbable condition, U ϭ 16.00, z ϭ 3.14, p ϭ .002. Single-sample tests revealed that children's explanations were predominantly realistic, as ratings exceeded the midpoint value of 2.5 for all outcomes in both conditions, all p values Յ .004, with the exception of the impossible version of House, p ϭ .528 (see Table 3 ). The same pattern of results was found when excluding data from trials where children deemed the outcomes possible (see the online supplemental materials).
Finally, we examined contingencies between whether explanations for each outcome mentioned magic or impossible events and whether children judged the corresponding outcomes to be impossible. The likelihood of children judging an outcome impossible was significantly higher than the likelihood of them providing a magical explanation for that outcome for all items, p values Յ .007, except the improbable version of the House outcome. See Table 4 for contingency tables, and Table 5 for McNemar tests giving the significance value for all contingencies.
Together, these findings confirm that 6-to 7-year-olds generally view both improbable and impossible to be impossible. This aspect of our findings replicates previous findings showing that children often deny that improbable events are possible (Lane et al., 2016; Nolan-Reyes et al., 2016; Shtulman, 2009; Shtulman & Carey, 2007; Weisberg & Sobel, 2012) . If anything, our participants were even more likely to deny the possibility of such events than has been previously observed. Nonetheless, we found that children predominantly gave realistic explanations for these outcomes. While children generally judged that the outcomes were impossible, they were far less likely to explain them by referencing magical or impossible events. 
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Experiment 2
In this experiment, we investigated whether children would continue to predominantly produce natural explanations if they were given more reason and opportunity to provide supernatural explanations. To examine this, we asked 6-to 7-year-olds about impossible outcomes, but made two changes to our procedure. First, to give children greater reason to produce supernatural explanations, in one condition we included stereotypical magical beings. For instance, we asked how a wizard came to have an impossibly long beard, and how a fairy came to have a unicorn. Second, to increase children's opportunity to provide supernatural explanations, we asked them a follow-up explanation question.
Participants
Thirty-two 6-and 7-year-olds were tested (M ϭ 6;8, range ϭ 6;0 -7;4, 17 girls).
Materials and Procedure
Children were told about impossible outcomes with either magical or ordinary agents. The outcomes in the ordinary-agent condition were identical to those from the impossible condition in Experiment 1 (i.e., we did not include any outcomes from the improbable condition), except the house made of clouds belonged to a woman, instead of a man. The outcomes in the magical-agent condition were identical except the ordinary people were replaced with magical beings, as follows: in the beard trial the person was a wizard, in the pet trial the person was a fairy, and in the house trial the person was a witch. The rest of the procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except an additional question was asked. Following the initial explanation question (i.e., "How did she get it?"), children were asked a follow-up question. For instance, if children said the fairy bought the unicorn, they were then asked "How did she do that?" This question was included to give children an additional opportunity to clarify their explanations.
Transcription, Coding, and Scoring
The same transcription, coding, and scoring procedures were used as Experiment 1. Of the 192 requests for explanations (96 initial, 96 follow-up), 163 yielded codable responses; the remaining 29 were noninformative (e.g., silences, "I don't know" responses, incoherent responses); see Table 3 . For the ratings of the possibility or likelihood of children's explanations, intercoder reliability was high, Cronbach's alpha ϭ .94. For the judgments of whether each explanation included magical or impossible events, the intercoder reliability was also high, Fleiss ϭ .84. Because children in this experiment provided two explanations for each outcome, responses to these questions were coded and scored separately. This meant that each child had two sets of scores: one for their initial explanations, and one for their follow-up explanations.
Results and Discussion
We first confirmed that children thought the outcomes could not happen; see Table 2 for the percentage of children saying that each outcome was impossible. For all three outcomes, most children in both conditions (sometimes all of them) judged that each outcome was impossible, binomial tests, all p values Յ .021.
We next examined coders' ratings of children's explanations on the scale ranging from 0 completely impossible to 5 completely possible, and separately analyzed ratings of initial explanations and follow-up explanations; see Table 3 for means ratings and standard deviations for each outcome. Children's initial explanations for House were rated more possible and likely in the magicalagent condition than in the ordinary-agent condition, MannWhitney U ϭ 50.00, z ϭ 2.00, p ϭ .048, but these ratings did not significantly differ across conditions for the other outcomes, both p values Ն .347. Single-sample tests showed that ratings of initial explanations were often realistic, and never predominantly fantastical (see Table 3 ). Ratings exceeded the midpoint value of 2.5 for Beard in both conditions, p values Յ .003, and for Pet in the ordinary-agent condition, p ϭ .051. The remaining ratings did not significantly differ from the midpoint.
Children's follow-up explanations of House were rated more possible and likely in the ordinary-agent condition than in the magical-agent condition, U ϭ 30.00, z ϭ 2.83, p ϭ .004; this difference was marginally significant for Beard, U ϭ 53.50, z ϭ 2.00, p ϭ .068, and nonsignificant for Pet, p ϭ .125. Single-sample tests showed that ratings were often realistic and rarely fantastical (see Table 3 ). Ratings of Beard exceeded the midpoint value of 2.5 in both conditions, p values Յ .049, ratings of Pet exceeded this value in the ordinary-agent condition, z ϭ 2.39, p ϭ .017, and ratings of House in the magical-agent condition were significantly lower than this value, z ϭ 2.32, p ϭ .020. The other ratings of follow-up explanations did not significantly differ from the midpoint value (see Table 3 ). For both initial and follow-up explanations, we found the same overall patterns when excluding data from trials where children deemed the outcomes possible (see the online supplemental material).
Finally, we examined contingencies between whether explanations mentioned magic or impossible events and whether children judged the corresponding outcomes to be impossible. The likelihood of children judging an outcome impossible was significantly higher than the likelihood of them providing a magical explanation for that outcome in all of children's initial explanations, p values Յ .041, except for the magical-agent version of House where this effect was marginally significant, p ϭ .074. We found the same Note. All significant effects indicate that the likelihood of children judging an outcome impossible was higher than the likelihood of them providing a magical explanation for that outcome.
effects for children's follow-up explanations, p values Յ .013, except the effect was marginally significant in the magical-agent version of Pet, p ϭ .074, and nonsignificant in the magical-agent version of House. See Table 4 for contingency tables, and Table 5 for McNemar tests giving the significance value for all contingencies. These findings again show that children predominantly give realistic and nonmagical explanations when explaining impossible events, and even do this under conditions that were intended to encourage magical explanations. The finding that children gave natural explanation even when explaining events involving magical beings is similar to a recent finding showing that when asked about how Santa Claus performs various impossible activities, children predominantly provide causal explanations and rarely mention magic (Shtulman & Yoo, 2015) . However, children in that study actually believed that Santa carried out those events, whereas children in the present study overwhelmingly denied that the outcomes they explained were possible.
Combined Analysis of Age Effects
We also conducted additional analyses to see whether the realism of children's explanations differed with age. To increase the sample size for these analyses, we combined data from the impossible condition of Experiment 1 with those from the ordinary-agent condition of Experiment 2 (initial explanations only). Children in these two conditions saw and explained the same outcome (the only difference was the gender of the agent in the House). Because children in Experiment 2 were asked for follow-up explanations, but children in Experiment 1 were not, we only included their initial explanations in these analyses.
To see whether responses differed with age, we used a median split on children's age-in-months to divide children into a younger group (range ϭ 72-79 months; 9 children from Experiment 1 and 8 from Experiment 2) and an older group (range ϭ 80 -88 months, 7 children from Experiment 1 and 8 from Experiment 2). We then examined whether coders' ratings of children's explanations differed across these groups and found no difference for Beard and Pet, Mann-Whitney tests, p values Ն .102. However, for House, ratings for younger children's explanations (M ϭ 4.11) were higher than those for older children (M ϭ 2.72), U ϭ 43.50, z ϭ 2.30, p ϭ .021. Thus, older children were more likely to provide supernatural explanations for one of our three outcomes.
General Discussion
In two experiments, we asked 6-to 7-year-olds to explain remarkable outcomes. In Experiment 1, children explained outcomes that were either improbable or impossible; in Experiment 2, they explained impossible outcomes that either featured ordinary agents or magical ones. In both experiments, children predominantly gave natural explanations for the outcomes, and they were more likely to affirm that the outcomes were impossible than to explain them with impossible or magical events. Children even predominantly generated natural explanations when explaining outcomes involving magical beings, and even when their explanations could not adequately explain the outcomes. For example, purchasing a unicorn at a pet store does not adequately explain how a person could come to have one, as unicorns do not actually exist and pet stores do not sell them.
Children's judgments were generally consistent across different kinds of extraordinary events. Explanations of how a man (or wizard) could have a very long beard, or how a girl (or fairy) could have a remarkable pet were almost always realistic, with few or no differences across conditions, and no developmental differences between younger and older children. However, explanations of how a woman (or witch) could have a remarkable house did vary across conditions, as children gave less realistic explanations in the improbable condition than in the possible one, and when the outcome involved a witch rather than a regular woman. Explanations of this outcome also varied with development, as older children gave less realistic explanations than younger children. This variation across outcomes suggests that children may be willing to give less natural or realistic explanations when they cannot think of compelling natural ones. However, the developmental difference for this outcome suggests that younger children may be especially unwilling (or unable) to give supernatural explanations.
Together, our findings suggest that 6-to 7-year-olds are strongly inclined to generate natural explanations, and join other recent findings in identifying psychological factors that shape children's explanations (Bonawitz & Lombrozo, 2012; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014 ). Children's inclination to generate natural explanations is broadly consistent with claims that children do not normally default to reasoning in terms of magical and supernatural causes, and only resort to reasoning in terms of the supernatural when their causal expectations and understandings are violated or when cultural support is provided (e.g., Browne, & Woolley, 2004; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & French, 2013; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994 , 2000 . However, our findings suggest that children's tendency to produce natural explanations is stronger than previously suggested or demonstrated: We found that children did not provide supernatural explanations even though their causal expectations and understandings were violated (they affirmed the outcomes were impossible) and even when cultural support for magical explanations may have been in place (i.e., when they explained outcomes involving familiar supernatural beings). Our findings contrast with some previous studies where children did provide supernatural explanations (Berzonsky, 1971; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Subbotsky, 2001 Subbotsky, , 2004 . Children in those studies might have given supernatural explanations because they might have seen no other way to explain the outcomes about which they were asked (e.g., their ignorance of heat sensitivity might have left them unable to explain why a piece of black foam changed colors when put into a person's hand; Phelps & Woolley, 1994) .
Our findings also fit with research showing that young children structure fictional and pretend worlds according to real-world rules (e.g., Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Sobel & Weisberg, 2014; Weisberg & Sobel, 2012; Weisberg et al., 2013 ; but also see Dias & Harris, 1988; Richards & Sanderson, 1999, and Van de Vondervoort & , for experiments suggesting otherwise) and that these rules even constrain what children can visually imagine (Lane et al., 2016) . This raises the possibility that children viewed our outcomes as fictions, and that their inclination to generate realistic story components explains their realism of their explanations. On this view, our findings could reflect processes specific to reasoning about fiction. However, we believe it more likely that the realism of children's fiction itself results from a This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
general tendency to reason according to real-world causal rules (Cook & Sobel, 2011; Lane et al., 2016) , and that this same general tendency also underlies our findings. The existence of an inclination to generate natural explanations also fits well with claims and evidence that explanations facilitate generalization, learning, and theory formation (e.g., Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, & Schulz, 2012; Lombrozo, 2006) . For example, 3-to 5-year-olds are more likely to learn the causal importance of gears, and successfully build their own operational machine, after generating explanations than after not generating explanations (Legare & Lombrozo, 2014) . It is unlikely that children would show similar benefits if they had instead used supernatural forces to explain how the machine operates. Doing this would make it difficult for children to discover the importance of its gears, to create a machine of their own, and ultimately to create a theory of gear operation. An inclination to generate natural explanations, and to avoid supernatural ones, may help to facilitate generalization and theory formation based on real world causal principles. However, because we only demonstrated this inclination in 6-to 7-year-olds, we cannot be sure whether it exists, or facilitates theory formation, in younger children.
The Relation Between Prediction and Explanations
The findings have important implications for the relation between prediction and explanation. Children are sometimes better at explaining outcomes than predicting them (Bartsch, & Wellman, 1989; Legare et al., 2009; Wellman, 2011) . For example, young children have difficulty predicting that someone will become ill after eating food that a dog licked. However, if they are told that someone became ill after eating the food, they can explain this outcome (Legare et al., 2009) . One account for this is that explanation only requires considering a few possible causes for a known outcome, whereas prediction requires considering the many possible outcomes that could result from a cause (Legare at al., 2009; Wellman, 2011) .
Our findings suggest an alternative reason for this asymmetry between explanation and prediction. In predicting, people normally consider what is possible and probable (i.e., they predict possible outcomes, rather than improbable or impossible ones). However, our findings show that children's explanations are less constrained by these factors, because children do explain improbable and impossible outcomes (i.e., and they view both outcomes as impossible). This could explain why children sometimes find explaining easier than predicting. Returning to the example of the contaminated food: Children may struggle with prediction because they do not believe that eating food licked by a dog will make anyone sick. However, they may succeed in explaining this outcome nonetheless because their explanations are not constrained by their skepticism of this outcome happening.
Our findings likewise suggest that we should be cautious when interpreting children's explanations. If children explain that an outcome resulted from some factor, we cannot assume that they believe that this factor is likely to ever cause the outcome. The explanation that someone has a unicorn because she bought it at a pet store does not reflect the belief that this causal link could ever happen. Instead it reflects an inclination to use natural causes when generating explanations.
Children's Reasoning About Possibility
Our findings are also informative about how children decide whether outcomes are possible. Shtulman (2009) proposed that children's difficulty with predicting the possibility of improbable outcomes is caused by their inability to imagine how they could occur (also see Shtulman & Carey, 2007) . Similarly, we could anticipate that children's decisions of whether outcomes are possible depend on whether they can explain the outcomes. Under this account, children should conclude that only unexplainable outcomes are impossible. Our findings show it is unlikely that such mechanisms completely account for children's difficulty. In our study, children generated many reasonable explanations for how improbable outcomes could occur before judging that they could not happen. Similarly, Woolley and Ghossainy (2013) found that providing children with explanations for improbable outcomes also did not increase the accuracy of their possibility judgments. Together with these previous findings, our study suggest that children deny that improbable events are possible even when they can imagine and explain how they occurred. Note, though, that this is not to deny that their connections between possibility judgments and the abilities to imagine or explain events (Koehler, 1991; Lane et al., 2016 ).
An alternative possibility raised by our findings is that children may judge that improbable outcomes are impossible solely because the outcomes are implausible. Under this account, explaining how an improbable or impossible outcome could occur (or imagining this) might not substantially affect possibility judgments: Despite having an explanation, the outcome will still seem unlikely and implausible (though this is not to deny that explaining could have some effect on plausibility). For example, this account suggests that explaining that someone bought a peacock at a store does not require believing that it would be plausible or likely for anyone to own a peacock. If this seems questionable, replace the peacock in this example with a unicorn. It is easy to imagine buying a unicorn, and children often mentioned this possibility in their explanations. But imagining this event is unlikely to make you feel that owning a unicorn is really possible.
Further Questions
One question raised by our findings concerns the developmental origins of children's inclination to generate natural explanations. We showed this inclination in children from a Western culture, who were predominantly middle-class. So it is possible that the inclination would not be observed in children from a different socioeconomic status (SES), or children in a non-Western culture. For instances, responses could differ in other cultures or SES groups because there are major cultural differences in the extent to which children ask explanation-seeking questions (e.g., Gauvain, Munroe, & Beebe, 2013) , and likewise major effects of SES on the content of parents' utterances to their children. Future research will be needed to discover whether the finding are stable across different demographic and cultural groups.
Similar questions concern whether our findings would differ if we tested older or younger children. We suspect that younger children might find our task linguistically challenging, but based on the developmental effects we found for the House outcome, we suspect that younger children would be even more likely to provide natural explanations. We might likewise expect that older This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
children would be more likely to provide supernatural explanations, at least for the truly impossible outcomes (i.e., because with age, children also increasingly recognize that improbable outcomes are actually possible; e.g., Shtulman & Carey, 2007) . These expectations are broadly consistent with findings revealing developmental increases in people's acceptance of supernatural phenomena and explanations (e.g., Astuti & Harris, 2008; Evans, 2001; Harris & Giménez, 2005; Raman & Gelman, 2004; Woolley et al., 2011) . However, it is worth remembering that children in our study explained outcomes that they did not actually believe were possible; in contrast, studies showing developmental increases in supernatural thinking typically focus on cases where people actually believe in the supernatural, and where there are culturally sanctioned supernatural explanations. Nonetheless, development in both areas could reflect age-related increases in children's willingness to supplement their causal knowledge of the real world with other causal principles. A related question concerns the type of outcomes children were asked about. In our experiments, children were asked about outcomes that referred to properties of the character. For example, children were asked about characters' beards, houses, and pets. These items were used because they were similar to those used in previous research about children's reasoning about possibility (Shtulman & Carey, 2007) , and because explanations for these outcomes would likely require children to draw on different types of causal knowledge. For example, explanations for the length of a beard might require biological knowledge, whereas explanations about possession of a pet might require an understanding of commerce. Unlike Shtulman and Carey (2007) , we focused on static outcomes (e.g., having a house made of clouds) rather than on dynamic events (e.g., making such a house). We avoided describing dynamic events to minimize the amount of information given that would constrain children's explanations. For instance, telling children that a woman made a house out of clouds would leave them less to explain, constraining their explanations to instances of her making it (when many other kinds of explanations could otherwise be given). Nonetheless, explanations for properties and events could differ-broadly consistent with this, recent findings suggest that impossible properties may be easier to visually imagine than impossible events (Lane et al., 2016, see p. 136) . Hence, future research should expand our findings by exploring children's explanations of other kinds of outcomes.
